How Has The Human Population Changed During The Last 50 Years? Brainly

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Facts Views Vis Obgyn. 2013; 5(4): 281–291.

The world population explosion: causes, backgrounds and projections for the hereafter

J. Van Bavel

Center for Sociological Research / Family & Population Studies (FaPOS), Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Leuven, Parkstraat 45 charabanc 3601, 3000 Leuven, Kingdom of belgium.

Abstract

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the total globe population crossed the threshold of 1 billion people for the beginning time in the history of the homo sapiens sapiens. Since and then, growth rates have been increasing exponentially, reaching staggeringly high peaks in the 20th century and slowing downwards a bit thereafter. Total world population reached vii billion merely after 2010 and is expected to count ix billion by 2045. This paper start charts the differences in population growth between the world regions. Next, the mechanisms behind unprecedented population growth are explained and plausible scenarios for future developments are discussed. Crucial for the long term trend will be the rate of decline of the number of births per woman, called total fertility. Improvements in instruction, reproductive health and child survival will exist needed to speed upward the pass up of total fertility, particularly in Africa. Just in all scenarios, world population will continue to grow for some fourth dimension due to population momentum. Finally, the paper outlines the debate about the consequences of the population explosion, involving poverty and food security, the impact on the natural environs, and migration flows.

Key words: Fertility, family unit planning, world population, population growth, demographic transition, urbanization, population momentum, population projections.

Keywords: Fertility, family planning, world population, population growth, demographic transition, urbanization, population momentum, population projections

Introduction

In the year 1900, Kingdom of belgium and the Philippines had more than or less the same population, around 7 meg people. By the year 2000, the population of the Western European monarchy had grown to x million citizens, while the South Eastward Asian republic at the turn of the century already counted 76 million citizens. The population of Kingdom of belgium has since then exceeded 11 meg citizens, merely it is unlikely that this number will rise to 12 million by the year 2050. The population of the Philippines on the other hand will continue to grow to a staggering 127 million citizens by 2050, according to the demographic projections of the Un (United nations 2013).

The demographic growth rate of the Philippines effectually the turn of the century (2% a yr) has already created enormous challenges and is clearly unsustainable in the long term: such growth implies a doubling of the population every 35 years as a consequence of which there would be 152 million people by 2035, 304 meg past 2070, and and then on. Nobody expects such a growth to actually occur. This contribution will discuss the more realistic scenarios for the future.

Even the rather modest Belgian demographic growth charge per unit around the turn of this century (0.46%) is not sustainable in the long term. In whatsoever case, it exceeds by far the boilerplate growth charge per unit of the human species (human sapiens sapiens) that arose in Africa some 200.000 years ago. Today, earth is inhabited by some vii billion people. To achieve this number in 200.000 years, the average yearly growth rate over this term should have been around 0.011% annually (so eleven extra human being beings per 1.000 human beings already living on earth). The current Belgian growth rate would imply that our land would have grown to 7 billion in less than 1500 years.

The point of this story is that the current growth numbers are historically very exceptional and untenable in the long term. The demographic growth rates are indeed on the decline worldwide and this paper will attempt to explain some of the mechanisms behind that process. That doesn't change the fact, however, that the growth remains extraordinarily high and the decline in some regions very slow. This is especially the example in Sub Saharan Africa. In absolute numbers, the world population volition continue to grow anyway for quite some fourth dimension as a event of demographic inertia. This too will be farther antiseptic in this paper.

The development of the globe population in numbers

In lodge to be sustainable, the long term growth rate of the population should non differ much from 0%. That is because a growth rate exceeding 0% has exponential implications. In simple terms: if a combination of nascency and growth figures only appears to cause a modest population growth initially, then this seems to imply an explosive growth in the longer term.

Thomas R. Malthus already caused this indicate of view by the end of the 18th century. In his famous "Essay on the Principle of Population" (first edition in 1789), Malthus argues justly that in time the growth of the population will inevitably wearisome down, either by an increase of the death rate or by a decrease of the nascency charge per unit. On a local scale, migration also plays an important part.

It is no coincidence that Malthus' essay appeared in England at the end of the 18th century. Later on all, the population in that location had started to grow at a historically unseen charge per unit. More specifically the proletariat had grown immensely and that worried the intellectuals and the elite. Year later twelvemonth, new demographic growth records were recorded.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the number of 1 billion people was exceeded for the first time in history. After growth accelerated and the number of 2 billion people was already surpassed around 1920. By 1960, some other billion had been added, in 40 instead of 120 years time. And it connected to get even faster: iv billion by 1974, 5 billion by 1987, 6 billion past 1999 and seven billion in 2011 (Fig. 1).

Historical growth of the world population since year 0

This will certainly not stop at the current seven billion. According to the most recent projections past the United nations, the number of viii billion will probably be exceeded past 2025, and effectually 2045 there will exist more than than 9 billion people¹. The further ane looks into the future, the more uncertain these figures get, and with demography on a earth calibration one must always take into account a margin of error of a couple of tens of millions. Merely according to all plausible scenarios, the number of 9 billion will be exceeded by 2050.

Demographic growth was and is not as distributed around the globe. The population explosion first occurred on a pocket-sized scale and with a relatively moderate intensity in Europe and America, more or less between 1750 and 1950. From 1950 on, a much more substantial and intensive population explosion started to have place in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Fig. 2). Asia already represented over 55% of the globe population in 1950 with its ane.iv billion citizens and past the year 2010 this had increased to iv.2 billion people or 60%. Of those people, more than than i.3 billion live in China and 1.2 billion in India, together accounting for more than i third of the world population.

Evolution of the population size by continent, 1950-2050*.

In the future, the proportion of Asia will come down and that of Africa will increase. Africa was populated past some 230 1000000 people around 1950, or nine% of the world population. In 2010 there were already more than than one billion Africans or 15% of the world population. According to United nations projections, Africa will continue to grow at a spectacular rate upwardly to ii.2 billion inhabitants in 2050 or 24% of the globe population. The proportion of Europe, on the other hand, is evolving in the reverse direction: from 22% of the globe population in 1950, over 11% in 2010 to an expected mere 8% in 2050. The population of Latin America has grown and is growing rapidly in accented terms, but because of the strong growth in Asia and especially Africa, the relative proportion of the Latin American population is hardly increasing (at most from 6 to 8%). The proportion of the population in North America, finally, has decreased slightly from seven to 5% of the world population.

What these figures mainly come down to in practice is that the population size in especially the poor countries is increasing at an unprecedented charge per unit. At the moment, more than 5.7 billion people, or more than 80% of humanity, are living in what the Un categorise equally a developing country. By 2050, that number would – according to the projections – have increased to eight billion people or 86% of the world population. Within this group of developing countries, the grouping of least developed countries, the poorest countries so to speak, is growing strongly: from 830 million now, up to an expected 1.seven billion in 2050. This comprises very poor countries such every bit Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Niger or Togo in Africa; Transitional islamic state of afghanistan, People's republic of bangladesh or Myanmar in Asia; and Republic of haiti in the Caribbean area.

The growth of the world population goes hand in paw with global urbanisation: while around the year 1950 less than xxx% of people lived in the cities, this proportion has increased to more l%. It is expected that this proportion volition continue to grow to 2 thirds around 2050. Latin America is the near urbanised continent (84%), closely followed by North America (82%) and at a distance past Europe (73%). The population density has increased intensely especially in the poorest countries: from 9 people per square km in 1950 to 40 people per square km in 2010 (an increase past 330%) in the poorest countries, while this figure in the rich countries increased from 15 to 23 people per square km (a fifty% growth). In Belgium, population density is 358 people per square km and in kingdom of the netherlands 400 people per square km; in Rwanda this number is 411, in the Palestinian regions 666 and in People's republic of bangladesh an astonishing 1050.

Although the world population will continue to grow in accented figures for some time – a post-obit paragraph will explain why – the growth charge per unit in percentages in all large world regions is decreasing. In the richer countries, the yearly growth rate has already declined to beneath 0.3%. On a global scale, the yearly growth rate of more 2% at the elevation effectually 1965 decreased to around one% now. A further decline to less than 0.5% past 2050 is expected. In the world's poorest countries, the demographic growth is all the same largest: at present effectually ii.2%. For these countries, a considerable decrease is expected, but the projected growth charge per unit would non autumn below 1.5% before 2050. This means, every bit mentioned to a higher place, a massive growth of the population in accented figures in the world's poorest countries.

Causes of the explosion: the demographic transition

The crusade of, kickoff, the acceleration and, then, the deceleration in population growth is the modern demographic transition: an increasingly growing group of countries has experienced a transition from relatively high to low birth and death rates, or is still in the procedure of experiencing this. It is this transition that is causing the modern population explosion. Figure iii is a schematic and strongly simplified representation of the modernistic demographic transition.

Schematic representation of the mod demographic transition.

In Europe, the modern demographic transition started to take place in the center of the 18th century. Until then, years of extremely high death rates were quite frequent. Extremely high crisis mortality could be the consequence of epidemic diseases or failed harvests and dearth, or a combination of both. As a upshot of improve hygiene and a ameliorate transportation infrastructure (for one, the canals and roads constructed by Austria in the 18th century), amidst other reasons, crisis mortality became less and less frequent. Afterwards on in the 19th century, kid survival began to better. Vaccination against smallpox for example led to an eradication of the disease, with the final European smallpox pandemic dating from 1871. This way, not only the years of crunch bloodshed became less frequent, but also the average expiry rate decreased, from an average 30 deaths per one thousand inhabitants in the starting time of the 19th century to around 15 deaths per 1000 citizens by the beginning of the 20th century. In the meantime, the nativity charge per unit however stayed at its previous, loftier level of 30-35 births per yard inhabitants.

The death rate went down but the birth rate still didn't: this caused a big growth in population. It was only almost the end of the nineteenth century (a bit before in some countries, later in others) that married couples in large numbers started to reduce their number of children. By the middle of the 20th century, the eye course platonic of a 2 children household had gained enormous popularity and influence. The reaction past the Church building, for instance in the encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), came much too belatedly to bring this evolution to a halt.

As a consequence of widespread family unit planning – fabricated even easier in the sixties by modern hormonal contraceptives – the nascency rate started failing as well and the population tended back towards zero growth. Nowadays the end of this transition process has been more than achieved in all European countries, because the fertility has been below replacement level for several decades (the replacement level is the fertility level that would in the long term pb to a birth rate identical to the decease rate, if there would be no migration)².

That the population explosion in the developing countries since the second half of the 20th century was and so much more intense and massive, is a issue of the fact that in those countries, the procedure of demographic transition occurred to a much more extreme extent and on a much larger scale. On the 1 hand, mortality decreased faster than in Europe. Afterward all, in Europe the decline in mortality was the upshot of a gradual agreement of the importance of hygiene and afterwards the development of new medical insights. These insights of course already existed at the outset of the demographic transitions in Asian, Latin American and African regions, whereby the life expectancy in these regions could grow faster. On the other hand, the total fertility – the average number of children per woman – at the start of the transition was a lot higher in many poor regions than it initially was in Europe. For South korea, Brasil and the Congo, for instance, the full fertility rate shortly after the Second World War (at the outset of their demographic transition) is estimated to be 6 children per woman. In Belgium this number was shut to 4.five children per woman by the centre of the nineteenth century. In some developing regions, the fertility and birth rate decreased moderately to very fast, but in other regions this pass up took off at an exceptionally sluggish pace – this will exist further explained later on. Every bit a effect of these combinations of factors, in nearly of these countries the population explosion was much larger than information technology had been in nigh European countries.

Scenarios for the hereafter

However, the process of demographic transition has reached its second phase in almost all countries in the globe, namely the phase of declining fertility and birth rates. In a lot of Asian and Latin American countries, the entire transition has taken place and the fertility level is around or beneath the replacement level. Republic of korea for example is currently at ane.ii children per woman and is one of the countries with the everyman fertility levels in the earth. In Islamic republic of iran and Brasil the fertility level is currently more than or less equal to Belgium'due south, that is 1.8 to one.nine children per woman.

Crucial to the future evolution of the population is the farther evolution of the nascency rate. Scenarios for the future evolution of the size and historic period of the population differ according to the hypotheses apropos the further evolution of the birth rate. The evolution of the birth rate is in turn dependent on two things: the further evolution of the full fertility rate (the average number of children per woman) in the first identify and population momentum in the second. The latter is a concept I volition subsequently on discuss in more detail. The office of the population momentum is normally overlooked in the popular debates, but is of utmost importance in understanding the farther evolution of the world population. Population momentum is the reason why we are equally good as certain that the world population volition continue to grow for a while. The other gene, the development of the fertility rate, is much more than uncertain but of critical importance in the long term. The rate at which the further growth of the world population can be slowed down is primarily dependent on the extent to which the fertility rates volition continue to decline. I volition further elaborate on this notion in the next paragraph. After that, I will clarify the notion of population momentum.

Declining fertility

Fertility is going down everywhere in the world, only it's going down specially slowly in Africa. A further refuse remains uncertain there. Figure 4 shows the evolution per world region betwixt 1950 and 2010, plus the projected development until 2050. The numbers before 2010 illustrate three things. Beginning of all, on all continents there is a decline going on. Secondly, this turn down is not equal everywhere. And thirdly: the differences betwixt the continents remain big in some cases. Asia and Latin America take seen a similar decline in fertility: from 5.9 children per woman in 1950 to two.5 at the start of the 21st century. Europe and North America had already gone through the largest part of their demographic transition by the 1950's. Their fertility level has been below replacement levels for years. Africa has indeed seen a global decrease of fertility, only the average number of children is all the same at an alarmingly high level: the fertility merely decreased from 6.7 to 5.1 children per woman.

Evolution of the total fertility rate by globe region: 1950-2050

These continental averages hide a huge underlying diversity in fertility paths. Figure 5 attempts to illustrate this for a number of countries. Firstly let us consider two African countries: the Congo and Niger. Every bit was oftentimes the case in Europe in the 19th century, fertility was outset on the ascent before information technology started declining. In the Congo this decrease was more all-encompassing, from around vi children in 1980 to 4 children per woman today, and a further pass up to simply below three is expected in the adjacent thirty years. Niger is the country where the fertility level remains highest: from seven information technology first rose to an average of just below 8 children per woman in the middle of the 1980'southward, earlier decreasing to just above half-dozen.five today. For the adjacent decades a decline to iv children per adult female is expected. But that is not at all certain: information technology is dependent on circumstances that will be further explained in a moment. The demographic transition is after all not a police force of nature just the result of human being actions and man institutions.

Development of the full fertility rate in some countries betwixt 1950 and 2010, and projected evolution until 2050.

Around 1950, Pakistan and Islamic republic of iran had more or less the same fertility level equally Niger, just both countries take seen a considerable decline in the concurrently. In Pakistan the level decreased slowly to the current level of 3 children per woman. In Iran the fertility decreased more abruptly, faster and deeper to below the replacement level – Iran today has one of the everyman fertility levels in the world, and a further decline is expected. The Iranian Revolution of 1978 played a crucial role in the history of Iran (Abassi-Shavazi et al., 2009): information technology brought better education and health intendance, 2 essential ingredients for birth control.

Brasil was also 1 of the countries with very high fertility in the 1950's – higher than the Congo, for example. The decrease started earlier than in Islamic republic of iran just happened more gradually. Today both countries take the same total fertility, below the replacement level.

Child mortality, education and family unit planning

Which factors crusade the boilerplate number of children to become downwards? The literature concerning explanations for the decrease in fertility is vast and complex, merely two factors emerge as crucial in this process: education and child survival.

Considering child survival first: countries combining intensive birth command with very loftier child mortality are simply non-existent. The statistical association between the level of child mortality and fertility is very tight and potent: in countries with high kid mortality, fertility is high, and vice versa. This statistical correlation is very potent because the causal relation goes in both directions; with quick succession of children and therefore a lot of children to accept care for, the chances of survival for the infants are lower than in those families with only a express number of children to accept intendance of – this is a fortiori the case where infrastructure for health care is defective. A high fertility level thus contributes to a high child mortality. And in the other direction: where survival chances of children improve, the fertility will go down considering even those households with a lower number of children have increasing confidence in having descendants in the long term.

It is crucial to understand that the turn down in child bloodshed in the demographic transition e'er precedes the decline in fertility. Men, women and families cannot be convinced of the benefits of birth control if they don't have confidence in the survival chances of their children. Meliorate wellness intendance is therefore essential, and a lack of good wellness care is ane of the reasons for a persistently loftier fertility in a country similar Niger.

Education is another factor that can cause a turn down in fertility. This is probably the near important factor, not just because education is an important humanitarian goal in itself (apart from the demographic effects), but too considering with instruction one tin kill 2 birds with 1 stone: pedagogy causes more nascency command but also better kid survival (recently conspicuously demonstrated by Smith-Greenaway (2013), which in its plow will lead to better birth control. The statistical correlation betwixt level of education and level of fertility is therefore very stiff.

Firstly, education enhances the motivation for birth control: if parents invest in the education of their children, they volition have fewer children, every bit has been demonstrated. Secondly, education promotes a more forrard-looking lifestyle: it will pb people to think on a somewhat longer term, to remember about tomorrow, next week and next month, instead of living for the mean solar day. This attitude is necessary for constructive birth control. Thirdly, instruction also increases the potential for effective contraception, because nascency control doesn't but happen, especially non when efficient family planning facilities are not or hardly attainable or when there are opposing cultural or family values.

The influence of education on birth control has been demonstrated in a vast number of studies (James et al., 2012). Information technology starts with principal educational activity, but an even larger effect can be attained by investment in secondary education (Cohen, 2008). In a country like Niger, for example, women who didn't finish principal school have on average 7.8 children. Women who did finish principal school accept on average half-dozen.seven children, while women who finished secondary school "simply" have 4.6 children (Fig. 6). The fertility of Niger would be a lot lower if more women could benefit from teaching. The tragedy of that country is that likewise many people fall in the category of those without a degree of primary school, with all its demographic consequences.

Association between level of didactics and total fertility rate in some poor countries.

Ane achieves with education therefore a plural benign demographic event on pinnacle of the of import objective of human emancipation in itself. All this is of course not always true but depends on which grade of "pedagogy"; I assume that we're talking well-nigh education that teaches people the knowledge and skills to better have command of their ain destiny.

It is one thing to get people motivated to do birth control but obtaining actual constructive contraception is quite some other thing. Information apropos the efficient utilize of contraceptives and increasing the accessibility and affordability of contraceptives tin can therefore play an important role. At that place are an estimated 215 million women who would want to take contraception only don't accept the means (UNFPA, 2011). Investments in services to assist with family planning are admittedly necessary and could already have great results in this grouping of women. Simply it's no use to put the cart before the equus caballus: if there is no intention to practice birth control, propaganda for and accessibility of contraception volition hardly have any effect, as was demonstrated in the past. In Europe the lion's share of the decline in fertility was realized with traditional methods, earlier the introduction of hormonal contraception in the sixties. There is oftentimes a problem of lack of motivation for nascence control on the one hand, as a event of high child mortality and low schooling rates, and a lack of ability in women who may exist motivated to limit fertility just are confronted with male person resistance on the other (Blanc, 2011; Practise and Kurimoto, 2012). Empowerment of women is therefore essential, and instruction can play an important role in that procedure besides.

Population momentum

Even if all the people would suddenly exercise birth control much more than is currently considered possible, the earth population would notwithstanding continue to grow for a while. This is the consequence of population momentum, a notion that refers to the phenomenon of demographic inertia, comparable to the phenomenon of momentum and inertia in the field of physics. Demographic growth is like a moving railroad train: even when you turn off the engine, the movement will go on for a little while.

The power and management of population momentum is dependent on the age structure of the population. Compare the population pyramids of Egypt and Germany (Fig. vii). The one for Egypt has a pyramidal shape indeed, merely the one for Deutschland looks more like an onion. As a effect of loftier birth rates in the previous decades, the largest groups of Egyptians are to exist plant below the age of forty; the younger, the more than voluminous the generation. Even if the current and future generations of Egyptians would limit their fertility strongly (equally is indeed the case), the nativity rate in Egypt would still go along to rise for quite some fourth dimension, just because year after twelvemonth more than and more potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages. Arab republic of egypt therefore clearly has a growth momentum.

Population pyramids of Arab republic of egypt (left) and Frg (right).

Deutschland on the other mitt has a negative or shrinking momentum: even if the younger generations of Germans would take a larger num ber of children than the generation of their own parents, the birth rate in Germany would nevertheless continue to subtract because fewer and fewer potential mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages.

The population momentum on a global scale is positive: even if fertility would decrease overnight to the replacement level, the earth population would continue to abound with 40% (from 7 billion to 9.8 billion). Only the rich countries take a shrinking momentum, that is -3%. For Europe the momentum is -7%. The population momentum for the poorest countries in the world is +44%, that of Sub Saharan Africa +46% (Espenshade et al., 2011).

Consequences of the population explosion

The concerns most the consequences of population explosion started in the sixties. Milestone publications were the 1968 volume The Population bomb by biologist Paul Ehrlich, the report of the Club of Rome from 1972 (The Limits to Growth) and the outset World Population Program of Action of the UN in 1974 amid others.

In the world population argue, the general concerns involve mainly three interconnected consequences of the population explosion: i) the growing poverty in the earth and famine; 2) the exhaustion and pollution of natural resources essential to homo survival; and 3) the migration pressure from the poor Southward to the rich North (Van Bavel, 2004).

Poverty and famine

The Malthusian line of thought continues to leave an important mark on the contend regarding the clan between population growth and poverty: Malthus saw an excessive population growth as an important crusade of poverty and famine. Rightfully this Malthusian vision has been criticized a lot. One must later on all take the contrary causal relation into account as well: poverty and the related social circumstances (like a lack of educational activity and good health care for children) contribute to loftier population growth also.

Concerning dearth: the production of nutrient has grown faster since 1960 than the world population has, so nowadays the amount of nutrient produced per person exceeds that which existed before the population explosion (Lam, 2011). The problem of famine isn't as much an insufficient food production every bit information technology is a lack of fair distribution (and a lack of sustainable product, just that's another result). Oftentimes regions with famine have ecological conditions permitting sufficient production of food, provided the necessary investments in man resources and engineering are made. The most important cause of famine is therefore non the population explosion. Famine is primarily a issue of diff distribution of food, which in turn is caused by social-economic inequality, lack of republic and (civil) state of war.

Poverty and famine unremarkably have mainly political and institutional causes, not demographic ones. The Malthusian vision, that sees the population explosion as the root of all evil, therefore has to exist corrected (Fig. eight). Rapid population growth tin indeed hinder economical development and can thus pave the fashion for poverty. Just this is only part of the story. As mentioned, poverty is also an underlying cause of rapid population growth. Social factors are at the base of both poverty and population growth. It's those social factors that require our intervention: via investments in education and (reproductive) health care.

Connections between social factors, poverty and population growth.

Impact on the environment

The bear on of the population explosion on the environment is unquestionably loftier, but the size of the population represents only one aspect of this. In this regard it can be useful to keep in mind the simple I=PAT scheme: the ecological footprint or impact on the environment (I) tin can be regarded as the product of the size of the population (P), the prosperity or consumption level (A for affluence) and the technology used (T). The relationship betwixt each of these factors is more than circuitous than the I=PAT scheme suggests, merely in whatever case the footprint I of a population of 1000 people is for example dependent on how many of those people bulldoze a automobile instead of a bike, and of the emission per car of the vehicle fleet concerned.

The ecological footprint of the world population has increased tremendously the past decades and the growth of the world population has obviously played an important office in this. The other factors in the I=PAT scheme accept however played a relatively bigger role than the demographic factor P. The considerable increase in the Chinese ecological footprint of the past decades for example, is more a event of the increased consumption of meat than of population growth (Peters et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2008). The carbon dioxide emission of China grew by 82% between 1990 and 2003, while the population only increased by 11% in that aforementioned flow. A similar story exists for Bharat: the population grew by less than 23% between 1990 and 2003, while the emission of carbon dioxide increased by more than 83% (Chakravarty et al., 2009). The consumption of water and meat in the world is increasing more rapidly than the population³. The consumption of water per person is for example threefold higher in the US than in China (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). The African continent has at present the same number of inhabitants as Europe and Due north America together, over 1 billion. But the total ecological footprint of Europeans and Americans is many times higher than that of Africans (Ewing et al., 2010). Less than 18% of the earth population is responsible for over fifty% of the global carbon dioxide emission (Chakravarty et al., 2009).

If we are therefore concerned about the impact of the world population on the surround, we can do something about it immediately by tackling our own overconsumption: it'south something we can control and it has an immediate effect. In dissimilarity, we know of the population growth that it will go on for some fourth dimension anyhow, fifty-fifty if people in poor countries would practice much more birth control than we consider possible at present.

Migration

The population explosion has created an increasing migration pressure from the South to the North – and there is likewise important migration inside and between countries in the South. Only here as well the message is: the main responsibleness doesn't lie with the population growth but with economical inequality. The main motive for migration was and is economic disparity: people migrate from regions with no or badly paid labour and a low standard of living to other regions, where one hopes to find work and a college standard of living (Massey et al., 1993; Hooghe et al., 2008; IMO, 2013). Given the permanent population growth and economical inequality, a farther increasing migration force per unit area is to exist expected, irrespective of the national policies adopted.

It is sometimes expected that economical growth and increasing incomes in the South will tedious downwardly the migration pressure, but that remains to be seen. Afterward all, it isn't usually the poorest citizens in developing countries that migrate to rich countries. It is rather the affluent eye class in poor countries that have the means to send their sons and daughters to the North – an investment that can enhance a lot of money via remittances to the families in the land of origin (IMO, 2013). There is subsequently all a considerable cost attached to migration, in terms of money and human being uppercase. Non everyone can bear those costs: to migrate you need brains, guts and money. With growing economic development in poor countries, an initial increment in migration force per unit area from those countries would be expected; the clan between social-economic development and emigration is non linearly negative but follows the shape of a J turned upside downwardly: more than emigration at the start of economic evolution and a decline in emigration merely with further development (De Haas, 2007).

7 Billion and counting… What is to be done?

A world population that needed some millennia before reaching the number of i billion people, but then added some billions more after 1920 in less than a century: the social, cultural, economic and ecological consequences of such an evolution are and then complex that they tin lead to fear and indifference at the aforementioned time. What kind of constructive reaction is possible and productive in view of such an enormous event?

First of all: we need to invest in education and wellness intendance in Africa and elsewhere, not just as a humanitarian target per se only likewise because it volition encourage the spread of birth control. Secondly, nosotros need to encourage and back up the empowerment of women, not just via didactics simply also via services for reproductive health. This has triple desirable results for demographics: it will pb to more and more than effective birth control, which in itself has a positive effect on the survival of children, which in turn again facilitates birth command.

Thirdly: because of the positive population momentum, the world population volition certainly go on to abound in absolute figures, even though the yearly growth charge per unit in percentages is already on the reject for several years. The biggest contribution nosotros could make therefore, with an immediate favourable impact for ourselves and the rest of the world, is to modify our consumption pattern and deal with the structural overconsumption of the world'south richest countries.

Footnotes

⁽¹⁾Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this paragraph are based on the Un World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/wpp/. Concerning projections for the time to come, I reported the results of the Medium Variant. Apart from this variant, there are also high and low variants (those relying on scenarios implying respectively an extremely high and extremely low growth of the population) and a variant in which the fertility rates are stock-still at the current levels. It is expected that the actual number will exist somewhere between the highest and lowest variant and will be closest to the medium variant. That'southward why I only report this latter value.

⁽²⁾In demography, the term «fertility» refers to the actual number of live births per women. By contrast, the term fecundity refers to reproductive capacity (irrespective of actual childbearing), come across Habbema et al. (2004).

⁽³⁾Run into http://www.unwater.org/h2o-cooperation-2013/water-cooperation/facts-and-figures

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Manufactures from Facts, Views & Vision in ObGyn are provided here courtesy of The Walking Egg Foundation

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3987379/

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